Although a relationship between established democratic political systems and environmental capacity has been described, the impact of the democratisation process on environmental capacity is not clear. The aim of this article is to determine the effect of both prior regime type and mode of transition on environmental capacity, through consideration of the cases of Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Spain. In addition, the importance of the European Union (EU) as an external actor shaping environmental capacity building is assessed. Findings indicate that variations in prior regime type and mode of transition had limited impact on environmental capacity development. Of greater importance were the persistent non-democratic legacies that influenced behaviours and actions during the democratisation period. The requirements of the EU were fundamental in ensuring environmental issues remained on the domestic political agenda.
Introduction
Previous studies have shown that democratic states perform better than nondemocratic states when dealing with a range of environmental issues (see Li and 1 The impact of moving from authoritarianism to democracy on environmental performance has been less well described than the effect of regime type per se. There is no predetermined path to democracy; each state democratises within the specific contextual constraints it faces (Tilly, 2004) . The uncertainty inherent within democratisation may present challenges to the development of environmental capacity in the short-term, as institutions and relationships are established and redefined. The nature of the democratisation process therefore requires consideration. This article focuses on two aspects in particular: the prior (non-democratic) regime type, and the mode of transition. Hite and Morlino (2004) argue that the form of prior regime type is important as it determines the non-democratic legacy and structures that democratising agents must either work with or challenge. The mode of transition can help determine whether there is a more complete break with the previous nondemocratic regime, or a degree of continuation (Munck and Leff, 1997) . Together, these characteristics determine the configuration of actors and structure shaping the democratisation process.
The aim of this article is to determine the effects of prior regime type and mode of transition on environmental capacity, by examining democratisation in the This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by SAGE in Political Studies on 1 May 2014, available online: http://psx.sagepub.com/content/63/3/589.abstract 4 Shin (1994, 143 ; see also Schneider and Schmitter, 2004) identified four common stages: decay of non-democratic rule, transition, consolidation, and maturation of the political order. Although there have been disagreements about the utility of this conceptualisation (see Carothers, 2002; O'Donnell, 2002) , it provides a useful framework within which more detailed analysis can take place. Central to any democratisation process is the transition stage, as this clears the space for the new political order to emerge. Recent analyses have argued that transitions from nondemocratic regimes do not automatically result in democracy, with some states moving towards new forms of non-democratic regime type or developing relatively stable semi-democratic hybrid systems (Bogaards, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010) .
The divergent trajectories are determined by the existing social and political context, as well as the character of the regime change itself.
Prior non-democratic regime type is an important factor influencing form of democratisation, determining the context within which change takes place. Significant features of prior regime type include the formal institutional architecture to be reformed, as well as values and patterns of behaviour that were introduced and entrenched during the non-democratic period (Hite and Morlino, 2004) . Three factors have been identified in determining the strength of these legacies: durability of the non-democratic regime, the level of institutional innovation, and the mode of transition (Hite and Morlino, 2004) . Institutional innovation is significant in this context, as it captures the extent to which the non-democratic regime was able to introduce changes that reflected and reinforced its particular vision. Therefore, democratising an innovative regime will require more extensive work to overcome and reform the embedded institutional patterns. Comparing totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, it is clear that the former involves more extensive innovation in This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by SAGE in Political Studies on 1 May 2014, available online: http://psx.sagepub.com/content/63/3/589.abstract 5 this regard, as the goal of the regime is to establish total control over society (see Linz and Stepan, 1996; Shapiro, 1972; Thompson, 2002) .
The form of the prior (non-democratic) regime influences the ability of the state to democratise and the rate at which this happens. Distinctions between regimes derive from the level of public participation and the extent of state institutionalisation (Huntington, 1968) . These measures provide a means to distinguish between authoritarian and totalitarian political systems. Authoritarian regimes maintain control through the deactivation and exclusion of independent/outside actors (O'Donnell, 1979) , while totalitarian regimes encourage higher levels of participation within carefully established and monitored limits (Arendt, 1966) . The degree of institutionalisation is greater in totalitarian regimes, due to the need for control, but also grows in authoritarian regimes over time, as they routinise control. Different regime types will therefore have an impact on the ability of the democratising regime to introduce change.
The mode of transition is important in determining the direction of the democratisation process and the structure of the political system that can be established. Whereas the prior regime type provides the base from which democratisation must proceed, the mode of transition determines the manner in which democratisation proceeds. Addressing this point, Munck and Leff (1997, 343-45) argue that: the mode of transition affects the form of the posttransitional regime and politics through its influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the institutional rules crafted during transition, and on key actors' acceptance or rejection of the rules of the game.
Elite actors play the central role in the democratisation process; although they may This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by SAGE in Political Studies on 1 May 2014, available online: http://psx.sagepub.com/content/63/3/589.abstract 6 not be directly responsible for initiating change, they direct the subsequent development. This point is illustrated by Tarrow's (1995, 205) (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004, 66) This requires identification of the source of the shift from non-democratic liberalisation to democratisation. The distinction can be drawn between an elite initiated (negotiated) process and one that is driven from below by mass opposition or non-elite actors (convulsive). Although the democratisation process opens the system to greater public participation over time, the extent and form of this participation is shaped by the system that is constructed early in the democratisation period.
Internal regime dynamics are central in determining the way in which the transition takes place, but external actors can also play an important role in influencing decision-making processes. The support of the EU has been a significant factor in the decisions taken at this level in South and Southeastern Europe, through the imposition of conditionality during the democratisation period (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Pridham, 2007) . In order to gain membership, prospective member states were required to align their policies and practices with those of the EU.
However, the growth in the breadth and depth of the regulations has obliged the EU to accept limitations on the ability of states to implement the full acquis communautaire on accession (Inglis, 2004) . The willingness of the EU to partially overlook the limitations of prospective members is due to the importance of the expected normative influence of membership. The first two dimensions refer to the state's perceived legitimacy and its ability "to conduct a coherent policy and... to secure resources from both domestic and international society in the design of policy" (Cummings and Nørgaard, 2004, 688) .
Effective state capacity is essential for the development and implementation of
For states undergoing democratisation and possessing limited domestic capacity, external actors (such as the EU) can provide important support and guidance in building capacity. Alongside policy development, the state also requires intellectual and organisational resources to ensure that the decisions are enacted through formal technical and implementational dimensions of state capacity (Cummings and Nørgaard, 2004) .
Examining state capacity during democratisation, Bäck and Hadenius (2008, 2) identify a U-shaped relationship, arguing that during the initial stages administrative capacity declines, and recovery is not seen until higher levels of democracy are reached. Effective capacity building relies on the "simultaneous establishment of democratic institutions and the development of vital political societal resources." (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008, 21) Strengthening domestic institutions will give the appearance of increased state capacity, but without stable participation and oversight it is not possible to ensure elite accountability. Reform of institutional structures is necessary but not sufficient to lead to stronger capacity, particularly in the area of environmental policy. The weakness of communist era environmental agencies in Eastern Europe revealed the difference between formal and substantive institutionalisation. Jänicke (2002, 8-9; see also Mikhova and Pickles, 1994) argues that environmental institutions in these countries "neither had stringently protected jurisdictions nor support from a strong ecology movement or an independent media." To be effective, changes in the institutional pattern "must be understood as part of a deeper process of cultural transformation." (Barry, 1999, 209) Dimitrova (2010) supports this point in relation to Eastern Europe, arguing that although the states in the region have adopted the formal requirements of the EU, informal rules and practices have been much slower to change.
Although the state may possess the formal capacity to address environmental issues, it will not necessarily do so unless there are sufficient incentives. This is particularly difficult in a period of democratisation where uncertainty presents many competing claims and pressures. This issue is captured by Carmin and VanDeveer (2005, 12) who argue that:
While capacity development requires well-trained and well-equipped personnel, it is also essential to have effective and efficient governmental and non-governmental organisations to establish appropriate institutional environments in which these organisations can operate.
Capacity in this area therefore moves beyond the state and must incorporate the role and influence of non-governmental actors as well as competing internal interests.
Examining levels of access and influence of such actors can provide a way of understanding of broader environmental capacity.
The development of environmental capacity in a democratising state will therefore be determined by the nature of the institutions that are created and the ability of actors to participate. In turn, these aspects will be shaped by the extent and form of non-democratic legacy that persists. The support provided by external actors will be filtered through domestic structures and perspectives (see Dimitrova, 2010; Goetz, 2001) . The relationship between the variables is represented in Figure 1 . Before examining the situation in the selected countries, the article introduces the 
Effect of democratisation on environmental capacity development in southern Europe
This section examines the details of the prior regime type and mode of transition in each of the four countries, as represented in Table 1 . The section also considers the key mechanisms (policy and administration) introduced to address and manage environmental issues and the countries' respective positions on public participation. 1946-1989 1926-1974 1948-1989 1936-1975 The regime of Todor Zhivkov and the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was organised around a centrally controlled economic system with a focus on rapid industrialisation (McIntyre, 1988) . Expressions of dissent were dealt with harshly by the regime, significantly reducing the space for opposition outside of state organisations (Linz and Stepan, 1996) . Immobility in the political system led to growing frustration among the population, as the country experienced economic stagnation, environmental degradation and dissent within the Turkish minority (Bell, 1997) . Faced with this opposition and changes in the wider region, the BCP forced Zhivkov to resign in November 1989, in order to maintain control over the process of regime change (Giatzidis, 2002) . Central to this process were roundtable talks involving the BCP, emerging opposition parties, representatives of the Turkish minority, and nationalist groups (Crampton, 1997) . These talks ended the dominance of the BCP and opened the political space to competition.
The removal of the BCP regime presented an opportunity to deal with the environmental degradation of the communist period, particularly as the environmental organisation Ekoglasnost 2 was part of the first post-communist government (Baker and Baumgartl, 1998 Ineffective administrative structures have led people to turn to informal networks based on kinship, common interests, or professional collegiality as an alternative (Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Bojkov, 2005) . This translates to low levels of action on environmental issues due to a feeling of inability to affect change, and the economic burden imposed by democratisation (Cellarius and Staddon, 2002 ). This appears to be changing as the economic and political situation stabilises (Interviews NGO representatives, Sofia, 16 and 21 May 2007) . The feeling of inability to affect change was also shaped by the nature of the NGO sector, with the lack of domestic sources of funding leading groups to turn to foreign donors, weakening links with domestic actors (Cellarius and Staddon, 2002 
Portugal
The regime of Antonio Salazar and Marcelo Caetano was based on a traditionalist ideology (Estado Novo) that promoted organic unity within society (Wiarda and Mott, 2001) . In order to maintain the system, the regime relied on institutional structures provided by the military, including extensive repressive apparatus, censorship and control of access to the public administration (Costa Pinto, 2003 (Bermeo, 2007) . The MFA was divided following the coup and the low level rank of the coup plotters challenged the internal hierarchy of the military, leading it to support democratisation as a way of withdrawing from the political sphere (Linz and Stepan, 1996) . However, the relative weakness of civil society actors meant that democratisation was dominated and controlled by elite actors (Costa Pinto, 2006 The weakness of the environmental agencies was also confirmed by a state official (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 354) This was reflected in the shift to industrialisation on a grand scale, including an attempt to remove the rural/urban divide, by bulldozing 7000 villages and moving the population to high rise apartment blocks (Linz and Stepan, 1996) . Where opposition emerged it was brutally suppressed and geographically constrained, such as when industrial workers in Braşov struck in 1987, demanding meat, bread and milk (Tismaneanu, 2003) . 11 The end of the regime followed escalating protests beginning in December 1989; the unfocused nature of the opposition allowed regime elites to seize control from (and execute) Ceauşescu and establish control over the initial democratisation (Hall, 2000) . . 12 Economic pressures meant that environmental issues were viewed as a necessary evil during the early transition period (Botcheva, 1996) . In 1995 the framework Law on Environmental Protection (LPM) was introduced, replacing a communist-era law and setting out mechanisms for implementation. 13 Specific sectoral laws followed on issues such as forests, 14 water, 15 and protected areas. 16 The content of these laws demonstrated recognition of the need to balance economic and environmental pressures. Many of the changes introduced during this period were made in the face of pressure from the EU, with an NGO representative (Interview, Bucharest, 27 June 2007) arguing I used to think that the EU is the only whip that you can use to move something in this country… it's not the only one, but it was one of the most powerful. Together, these show the rights of the population to obtain and make use of information without fear of prejudice from the state, indicating a significant shift.
While the EU has encouraged progress, it was argued that change is not always
Where public participation does take place its efficacy has been questioned, with an NGO representative (Interview, Bucharest, 27 June 2007) noting:
Public administration sometimes organises public hearings where NGOs are involved and citizens are involved and then when you look at the transcription of the discussions, you didn't say anything.
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The result of this is that people are not aware of their rights with regard to public participation, and where they do become involved there is a perception that it will not have any effect on the outcome (Interview, NGO representative, Bucharest, 20 June 2007). Parau (2009, 125) notes that locals opposing the proposed Roşia Montană gold mine were 'were not only unaccustomed but actually fearful of challenging state authority.' Analysis conducted on non-voting political activity indicates that there was a decline between 1996 and 2004, the period at which the democratisation process was beginning to consolidate (Sum, 2005) . This is a challenging issue; during the initial democratisation period, civil society was weak due to lack of history, yet the level of engagement has not increased substantially as the democratisation process has stabilised.
Spain

Democratisation in Spain followed the death of General Franco in November
1975. The Franco regime exercised control through repression to control dissent and corporatist structures to co-opt economically important actors, such as trade unions (Pierson, 1999) . This combined strategy can be seen in the introduction of emergency powers and legislation allowing associations to 'formulate and contrast legitimate opinion' during 1969 (Preston, 1986, 14-5) . Adopting a dual strategy enabled the regime to generate legitimacy while maintaining control over those that dissented. and a willingness to bypass existing regulations (Pardo, 1997) .
Legacies from the authoritarian regime are apparent in the area of public participation. Although there is legislation 22 in place to facilitate participation, its effect has been restricted by unwillingness of the state to encourage such action and hesitance among the population to get involved (Todt, 1999) . Addressing the state's approach, Börzel (1998, 73) has argued that:
Spanish environmental policymaking reflects a reactive problem-solving approach which relies heavily on regulatory, command and control instruments and where the 'costs' of environmental protection are weighed against the 'benefits' of economic development.
This formalised structure has also been compounded by the practice of social concertation, which has sought to institutionalise consultation and cooperation (see (Jiménez, 2007) .
The Impact of Democratisation on Outcomes
Each of the countries considered in this article has made progress in Having identified these trends across the countries, it is important to examine indicators that can determine whether the changes outlined have translated to improvements in environmental outcomes. To this end, this article now considers changes in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions (metric tons per capita) alongside changes in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the period leading up to and following democratisation. 23 The use of CO 2 in the analysis is justified by its ubiquity as an output of modern industrial processes and societies. As a climate gas, CO 2 emissions are also a frequent target for reduction or management at the national, regional and global level, as illustrated by efforts to develop carbon capture and storage technologies (Tjernshaugen, 2011 ) and the ongoing debate over nuclear energy (Duffy, 2011) . This visibility and perceived importance implies that reductions of CO 2 emissions correspond to other efforts to limit environmental degradation.
Considering GDP alongside changes in CO 2 emissions allows for an examination of 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 The situations in Bulgaria and Romania (Figure 2 ) were more complicated and varied. In each country, the onset of democratisation saw significant falls in CO 2 emissions and GDP. This can be linked to the closure or privatisation of large and inefficient state-owned enterprises favoured by the prior regimes (see Fidrmuc, 2003) .
During the early democratisation period, both indicators remained relatively low, with GDP growth beginning to return in a consistent manner only in 2000. By contrast, CO 2 emissions fell slightly from 1996 and remained low despite the onset of economic recovery in 2000. This pattern would appear to suggest the influence of the EU, as pressure to conform to conditionality (addressing environmental issues) was matched with increased opportunities in the economic sphere, resulting from the prospect of impending membership. Although foreign direct investment provided support in restructuring industries and supported efficiencies that would reduce emissions, the bulk of this investment came after 2003, when the divergence between CO 2 emissions and GDP was already established (see Kalotay, 2008) . The case studies and figures present a mixed picture regarding the relationship between democratisation and environmental capacity. There have been improvements in environmental policy development and institutional creation in all of the countries during the democratisation period. In each case, this signified an improvement on performance of the preceding non-democratic regime. The cases also show a degree of consistency in the development of formal environmental capacity, with rights and responsibilities enshrined in new constitutional documents leading to environmental policies in the relevant areas. However, the implementation and enforcement of these new regulations was perceived to be undermined by a lack of political will to undermine economic performance. The lack of sustained improvement was apparent in the CO 2 emissions data in Portugal and Spain, although in Bulgaria and Romania Turning to the effect of prior regime type and mode of transition on environmental performance during democratisation, the relationship is more evident.
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Within the regions it made little difference whether the regime change was initiated by a sudden shock (convulsive) or negotiated by regime elites. The greatest variation during the initial democratisation period was across the regions, with Bulgaria and Portugal seeing a significant fall in CO 2 emissions following the regime change, while in Spain and Portugal there was little change (with the exception of Spain's initial increase). Drawing on the case study analysis, this can be linked to the prior regime type, as the intense focus on rapid industrialisation and central control in the Southeast European states provided the conditions that enabled a more substantial fall following democratisation. In Southern Europe, the less intensive form of industrialisation and market economy meant that the break with the past was far less radical. This suggests that the prior regime type has a role to play in shaping environmental outcomes during democratisation.
Finally, the EU played a key role in the environmental politics of all four of the countries. Pressure to implement EU directives and meet conditionality led to improvements in formal policy structures. The difference between the two regions is that the earlier accession of Portugal and Spain allowed them to gain entry before environmental issues entered the EU's core political agenda. This provided some room for manoeuvre from within, as they were able to adapt and develop their environmental capacity as part of the wider EU effort to address environmental issues.
Conditionality was more important for Bulgaria and Romania and exerted influence on their domestic policymaking. 25 This was reflected in the case studies, as well as in the data, as CO 2 emissions and GDP began to diverge from the late 1990s, when they 
Conclusion
Democratisation provides an opportunity for a state to strengthen its environmental capacity. Capacity in this regard refers to the extent to which the state is seen as a legitimate actor and also possesses the necessary intellectual and organisational resources to ensure that decisions taken are enacted. Moving towards democracy involves the creation of institutions and mechanisms that are more able to utilise feedback and adapt to changes in the external environment.
This article has assessed the effect of both prior regime type and mode of transition on environmental capacity, through consideration of the cases of Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Spain. The findings demonstrate that, although totalitarian regimes exercise a greater degree of control over social, political and economic spheres than authoritarian political systems, this does not appear to hinder the development of environmental capacity. The extent of reform and reconstruction is more extensive in totalitarian regimes, but the nature of the reforms required means that changes take time to embed, regardless of the prior regime type. Differences in the mode of transition (convulsive versus negotiated) in the cases examined also appeared to have had limited impact on subsequent development of environmental capacity. This is consistent with the argument made by Bäck and Hadenius (2008) , that democratisation is a period of instability regardless of the mode of transition.
Although there may be some limited gains in the short-term from the greater stability associated with negotiated regime changes, these are mitigated by the slower pace at which the system can be restructured.
Similarities in the experiences of the four countries appear to derive from two key factors. The first is the length of time that the non-democratic regime was in power. In each case, the preceding non-democratic regime was in power for at least 40 years, sufficient to deeply embed norms and practices associated with the nondemocratic regime. This has been illustrated in the difficulties faced by civil society actors in attempting to engage with the democratised states, as hierarchical and elitist patterns have continued. Experiences under the non-democratic regime left extensive legacies that continued to shape behaviours within the state and society, long after democratisation had been initiated. Secondly, the cases also indicate the importance of external actors in shaping the emerging democratic political system. In particular, support provided by the EU ensured that environmental policies and practices were introduced during the early democratisation and were maintained as the respective political systems consolidated. The priorities of the EU meant that the regimes also converged in how they dealt with environmental issues and management. It is also important to note that, although the EU has required the adoption of policies, institutions and practices to improve environmental capacity, there are areas of weakness. Problems of implementation are important in this regard, as the countries introduced change without enforcement mechanisms and popular support necessary to ensure effectiveness. As Goetz (2001) notes, policies and directives from the European level are filtered through the lens of domestic priorities, thereby limiting the extent to which European priorities can be embedded.
In conclusion, the findings indicate that there is a generally positive relationship between democratisation and environmental capacity. Support from the EU was crucial in ensuring that environmental issues remained on the domestic political agenda during democratisation. The findings also suggest that without sufficient domestic political will to support the development of environmental capacity progress will be limited. Non-democratic legacies play an important role in this regard, shaping the manner in which policy is developed and participation by non-state actors is perceived.
1 While it has been argued that an eco-authoritarian regime could more effectively address issues of environmental degradation (see Orr and Hill, 1978 ) the abdication of citizen responsibility would undermine the aims over the long-term (see Barry, 1996; Paehlke, 1995) 
